Individual Mandate not necessary – But will you like the alternative?

Download PDF Report >>>Individual Mandate Alternative

SUMMARY

Of all the issues in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or PPACA), one that has drawn an extraordinary amount of attention is the Individual mandate. Looked at in isolation, it may seem like an overreach. However, a broader view indicates why this provision or similar was included at all.

It is included because another section of ACA prohibits Health Insurers from rejecting people with pre-existing conditions as they do now. Some medical conditions may be avoidable, but the vast majority of pre-existing conditions occur through no fault of the individual. Insurance of all types is to spread risk, and the more skewed the risk the greater the need for insurance. Health costs are extremely skewed making health insurance vital to a modern economy.

ACA mandated that everyone buy insurance and that makes sense. However, the objection is forcing people to buy from a private company. There are several options to resolve that. One is to create a government-run insurer. That would eliminate forcing people to buy from a private insurer. A second is to make payment for any service obtained by an uninsured person a loan similar to student loans that could not be discharged for any reason. They would carry interest and be payable in full no matter the circumstances.

DISCUSSION

The percent of people with pre-existing conditions is small and to the majority of folks without such a condition, it may seem like a trivial matter. However, the number of people with pre-existing conditions is in the millions, and the cost to them has been and can be horrific. Medical expenses for these people have led to thousands of bankruptcies as health care costs sapped all their savings and more.

Insurers soon will be required to insure ALL persons regardless of medical condition. There is the very real risk of some people will avoid buying insurance, and then when they have an injury, or find they have a chronic condition like asthma or diabetes, they would only buy health insurance AFTER they know they have a medical condition.

One would think that any notion of personal responsibility would have all persons get insurance in order to spread health costs risks over the greatest population. The more people that buy insurance, the lower the cost per person. However, experience has shown that some people will NOT buy insurance if they feel they will not get sick or injured.

Fortunately, many employers offer health insurance for their employees, and by law, health insurers covering insurance through work (group insurance) MAY NOT exclude people with pre-existing conditions after some limited period of time, usually less than a year. However, the same did not apply to individuals until health care reform.

Note that employed individuals usually have access to health insurance.  Full time employees, that is. With rising costs, what have many employers done including some of the largest?  They have reverted to greater use of part time employees who do not enjoy the same privilege and access to health insurance as do full time employees. This is putting more pressure on reforming individual insurance plans.

People do not just dream up laws in a vacuum. Most fall into two categories. One is responses to maintain clean food, air and water, or help disadvantaged people, often the result of some abuse (social laws). The second are financial laws, like taxes or efforts to reduce taxes via special treatment for some (loopholes). ACA addresses the former by adding a financial provision, the individual mandate.

Everyone who works pays into social security and Medicare. Since Medicare is health insurance, there already is a mandate for working individuals to buy health insurance from the government. The only distinction is that Medicare is government-run insurance, while the ACA mandate applies to buying insurance from private companies.

ALTERNATIVE ONE

In the state run insurance exchanges to which any health insurer can join, add a government-run health insurer. Then the individual mandate does not require buying from a private insurer. However, if an individual decided against all private insurers they would have to buy the government-run insurance plan, just like Medicare and clearly legal.

However, politics intervened. Draft legislation DID INCLUDE a government-run insurer. They called it the “Public option”. It would operate on the same level field as private insurers and not be subsidized in any way. Private and government insurers would compete for business. Still, critics objected, and politicians stripped this provision from the final bill.

Why the objections?  Perhaps it was fear of competition.  To understand the public option, all one has to do is look at Medicare. Different in that it would cover people under 65 years old. In addition, women over 65 do not get pregnant, so there would be some differences in coverage.

What few know is government manages Medicare entirely through private health insurers. Insurers use a term Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) do describe how much of a premium dollar goes to pay health care costs. For Medicare, the MLR is over 95% meaning over 95 cents per premium dollar goes for health benefits. For private insurers, not so much. Their average MLR is in the low 80% range, and for individual insurance, which Medicare is, the MLR is even lower. How can private insurers compete with someone whose costs are less than one quarter of their own?

The honest answer is they cannot, at least not as currently structured. However, where does the constitution guarantee private enterprise continued profitability or even existence? “Destructive renewal” is a term used by business to explain competition that virtually by definition requires companies to fail as other more efficient companies market their goods and services for less; or whose new goods and services make prior ones obsolete (think cassette tapes).

It is worth noting that private health insurers used to have MLR’s in the mid 90%, but that was 30 years ago when nearly all insurers were non-profit.  Over time, for-profit insurers became more prevalent, and as they did, they had to show a profit for their investors. Some admin efforts were devoted to marketing. Some to reducing costs. Some to profits. The net effect, however, is that far fewer dollars went for health care costs and more went for overhead and profits. Yet some of these same companies administer Medicare contracts for less than 5 cents on the dollar. What is apparent is that insurers could cut back on what it now costs them to weed out people with pre-existing conditions, but more efficiency are needed to compete.

ALTERNATIVE TWO

Set the ground rules for individual insurance similar to that of group insurance obtained through work. If a person elects not to purchase insurance, and gets sick or injured, a person could still buy insurance but the law would allow pre-existing exclusions to extend for one year. Also like group insurance, if a person previously had health coverage, and not more than 60 days elapsed without coverage, then the person could buy health insurance with no waiting period.

This alternative needs to have a bit more teeth to be effective. This is because there is a law that hospitals have to treat EVERYONE, regardless of ability to pay, and a healthy person could delay for years purchase of health insurance. They would only buy insurance when they get sick.

The current Medicare drug program provides a template for solving this issue. If a senior fails to purchase drug insurance, the premium continues to rise for as long as one remained uninsured. One can apply a similar index to health insurance. But how does one provide assurance of payment? Since the person required services, it should be legal to require the person to purchase insurance to pay for those services, and if the person is unable or unwilling to pay, the government could advance a loan similar to student loans.

That loan would bear interest, need to be paid over time (though shorter than for student loans), and could not be discharged by bankruptcy. If not paid by retirement, payments would be deducted from that person’s social security, just like student loans.  Gone is the mandatory requirement. Replacing it is an automatic loan that the individual must repay in full with no exits.

Since the government would initially pay the hospital, it also could determine the ability to pay of the person getting treatment. If that person was indigent, they could be put on Medicaid, and no medical loan would be created.  If the person’s income were within the subsidized amount, they would have been eligible for had they carried insurance, the loan would be reduced by the amount of the subsidy. Since the hospital is paid in full, there would be no cost shifting to those who bought insurance.

ALTERNATIVE THREE

As noted above, a law requires hospitals to treat EVERYONE, regardless of ability to pay. One could rescind that law and force everyone to either have insurance, pay for service, or be denied service. But few would be willing to take that backward step. From a practical standpoint, this is not a viable option.

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Insurers’ Efforts to Shift Admin Costs to Medical Costs

Download PDF Report >>> Insurers’ Efforts to Shift Admin Costs

Senator Rockefeller recently came out with a report cautioning about health insurers efforts to shift Selling, General and Administrative (SGA) expenses to medical costs.  A shift would increase medical loss ratios (MLR) allowing insurers to keep more earnings. Two uncertainties affect predictions.  First is how plans are grouped and second is how one computes “medical costs” and “premiums”.  Below are reasonable interpretations of the new law that favor consumers, not insurers.

HOW ENROLLEES ARE GROUPED

The first order is to define “group.”  The more groups are combined, the greater the opportunity for balancing out gains and losses, which is the whole idea of insurance.  Continue reading

Insurers Hide Profitability Behind Return on Sales

Download PDF Report>>> Insurers Hide Profitability Behind Return on Sales

SUMMARY

Health insurance companies have repeatedly claimed their earnings were a very modest 3-5% return on sales. Implicit in their claim is that many others earn far greater returns.  But comparing sales ratios to other industries can be misleading.

High value added industries like software have high sales margins.  Low value added industries like groceries and insurance and have low sales margins. While health insurers may not compare well with the high valued group, they show very fair returns compared with lower added value industries.

Other financial ratios used to compare include ROI and ROE that key not on sales but on gross and net investment. How much money was used to generate profits.  Here the picture is significantly more favorable for health insurers. They are not only near the top of basic industries, but are well positioned compared with more discretionary industries.

RETURN ON SALES

Return on sales, while prevalent, is not the only financial ration used to compare performance.  Each ratio has its strengths and weaknesses.  The weakness of return on sales is that it completely obscures the differences in the value companies add to the goods and services that they sell.

The chart below highlights returns for three industries based on value added. (Ratios are for example only.) The bottom bar represents high value added firms like computer software where purchased goods and services are nominal compared to what they pay their staffs and what they earn on sales.

The mid range covers companies like manufacturers who buy raw materials and intermediate goods, perform significant steps (like conversion and assembly) incurring added costs, and (hopefully) sell at a margin above their internal costs.

Finally, at top are industries where the bulk of their costs are purchased, like groceries and insurance, and while they add value it is small compared to their purchase costs.

In all three cases, a consistent ratio of internal costs of 60% and margin of 40% was applied.  But notice that the margin on final sales (at 100%) ranges from 36% for high value added industries to only 4% for low value added. To rely on returns based on sales is meaningful only within industries with similar value added components.

INDUSTRY COMPARISON OF RETURN ON SALES

Ratios of returns on sales are also influenced by where they stand on a “necessity” scale.  Sales for basic items like food, housing, and utilities, tend to be fairly stable and many of their costs are simply “passed through” to the customer. The more the pass through, the lower the markups tend to be.

Conversely, purchases discretionary purchases for luxuries, entertainment, and cell phones can be expected to have higher margins.  Sales levels are more affected by economic conditions and higher margins compensate for greater risks.

As noted, health insurers act like the poor kid on the block using net profits on sales.  It is true that a group of industries have far better returns than health insurers as shown below. The chart shows returns based on net profit margins divided by sales (Source: Yahoo Finance – Industry Index by Sector).

Insurers ARE the “poor kids on this block.”  But look at the “block.” Cigarettes, beer, wine and liquor, golf clubs and perfume, cell phones and cable TV.  These industries can hardly be defined as meeting basic customer needs.  These are discretionary purchases that can cut back on during tough times.  Purchases of basic necessities are harder to cut back.

Below is a different group of industries covering more basic needs. One would reasonably assume that health insurance is a basic industry and where value added is small compared to total costs.  While Health Insurers (gold bar) may not be the highest in this group either, they are by no means the lowest.  What you don’t see are these other industries complaining about their low returns on sales as health insurers do.

OTHER FINANCIAL RATIOS:  ROI/ROA AND ROE

With wide swings in returns based on sales revenue, Wall Street uses several other ratios to compare rates of return. One is return on investment (ROI).  Buy a CD and earn 2.5%.  It’s simple.  ROI = 2.5%.  Now buy a house. Pay cash and it’s just like a CD.  But if you take out a mortgage, you have leveraged your returns.  Your house will change value the same regardless of how much equity you have invested. But your Return on equity investment (ROE) is different.

The chart below shows how this works. Assume you buy a house and take out a mortgage for 60% of the purchase. A number of years later, you sell the house for 20% more than you paid.  If you had paid cash, your return would be 20%. But if you had mortgaged 60%, you put up only 40% cash and your return is a 50% (20% return /40% cash invested). ROE is similar to return on investment (ROI) or assets (ROA) but reflects only the net amount of equity investment.

INDUSTRY COMPARISON OF RETURN ON EQUITY

Previously described were two groups of industries, those dealing in basic necessities, and those more in discretionary items.  The groups are the same but comparison is different, using the return on equity (ROE) ratio as just described.

Again we begin with the discretionary group where health insurers fared poorly.  Using ROE ratios, health insurers rose in rank, passing up beer, cable TV and cell phones.  Again, one has to ask whether anyone should be comparing the service provided by health insurers to be in this “block.”

Wall Street considers returns on equities in the 15-16% to be normal average for all industries. But again the question is whether health insurers should be considered “average” when they satisfy basic needs where lower ROE’s are expected.

Comparing health insurers with the same group of basic industries shown previously, the picture below dramatically changes.  Insurers are near the top of the group with the majority of industries coming in lower.  These industries are more suitable comparisons than insurers prefer to use.

One final observation.  Health insurance used to be heavily non-profit. For profit insurers came later as life insurance companies began to diversify into more profitable fields.  Now look at the ROE for life insurance: at the bottom.

Download PDF Report>>> Insurers Hide Profitability Behind Return on Sales

Fact Check: Lines of Business Obscure Profit Margins

Download PDF Report >>> Lines of Business Obscure Profit Margins

FACT CHECK: In 2009, the percentage of premiums that went towards administrative costs and profits declined for the sixth year in a row and have been consistent for decades.

FACT CHECK CHECKED: America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) combines self-insured line of business (LOB) and insured LOB and presents the results as if it were one homogeneous market.   Nothing could be further from the truth. Size wise, the ratio of self insured LOB to insured LOB is roughly 58% / 42% of self-insured / insured or underwritten.

Insurers charge self-insured (ASO – administrative service only) groups an administrative fee that, for the top 10 health insurers, averaged 6.94% of costs.  That translates to 6.5% of “premiums” which are really medical benefits plus service fee income.  This “efficient” administrative expense is not evident in the insured LOB.

To identify the administrative costs and profits for the insured group, one computes and then removes the self-insured revenues and expenses from the CMS Totals as shown in the table below.  Sources and stepwise methodology (top to bottom) are shown in the far right column.

The claim that insurers’ average percentage of premiums that went towards administrative costs and profits was around 11.75% (and have been consistent for decades) totally obscures two radically different lines of business with divergent expense ratios.   For 2008, self-insured admin costs and profits were about 6.5% for self-insured groups, but about 18% for insured groups.  Since the profit margin is VERY slim for the self insured, the bulk of profits are born on the backs of the insured groups which include small business and individuals. A reasonable question to ask is “why are insurers satisfied with profit margins of well under 1% on 55 % of their business but feel a need to push margins well beyond 10% on 45% of their business?”  Though risk is a small factor in the insured LOB, they have to compete far harder on self-insured LOB than on insured LOB where they hold oligopoly power in local market areas and convert that market power into profits.

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Non-Partisan CBO Estimates of Healthcare Reform

Download PDF Report >>> CBO Estimate of Healthcare Reform

SUMMARY

Few doubt how unsustainable current medical trends are.  With medical inflation consistently outpacing the CPI, health costs will continue to take a greater share of the economy. Private insurers claim they can solve the problem with reform but without a Public Option.  History suggests this is a dubious claim at best.  Looked at from multiple angles, private insurers are not likely to succeed.  Profits gains have far exceeded key indices, medical loss ratios have gone way down while costs have gone way up, competition is diminished by concentration of major insurers, and tort reform complaints carry little water.

DISCUSSION

The graph below shows CBO projections of under 65 population by insurance group. The top, red bars are the uninsured that continue to grow each year.  While insurance through employment is fairly consistent, greater employee cost sharing is an increasing burden.

Neither the Senate nor House reform proposals provide financial support to unauthorized immigrants.  When analyzing various effects of reform, this group has no effect. For data consistency for both before and after reform, unauthorized immigrants are not included in the populations.  Removal lowers uninsured population between 5 and 8 million over the 10 year period.

 Source: CBO, Oct 7, 2009 letter to Senator Baucus

While the country may be coming to some agreement that reform is needed, differences exist on how to achieve reform. Health Insurers want to have participation mandatory which is a valid point. Except they have offered no other steps on how to reduce costs and are against Public Option that would offer real competition. However, they would be beneficiaries of millions of new customers.

Those customers would come from those currently uninsured, or insured through individual and employer groups. In the graph next column, CBO assumes reform includes an Exchange that would shift nearly 40 million from uninsured, individual and employer groups (left side of graph) to Medicaid and the Exchange (right side).  Note that not all the movement is to the Exchange.  A large number of uninsured poor would switch to Medicaid.  Still, the Exchange is expected to grow quickly to nearly 25 million. This group is the target for private insurers and Public Option.

So why is it necessary to have a Public Option on the Exchange?

 On its face, private insurers could certainly cover 25 million new enrollees without government involvement. But the catch is that the government IS involved because of another feature of reform.

 Source: CBO, Oct 7, 2009 letter to Senator Baucus

That reform feature is “affordability credits”.  Even those with insurance find their total health care costs consume so much of their income that they do not get needed care. Affordability credits help those with lower incomes pay premiums and shared health costs. The effect is shown in the chart below. Medicaid pays for the very poor while credits help less well off people in the Exchange.

 Source: CBO, Oct 7, 2009 letter to Senator Baucus

In short, the Government will be paying some $100 billion each year in credits to Exchange enrollees, much of it going towards insurance premiums.  Will private insurers provide good value for this outlay? Their track record is not encouraging. 

Health care costs fall into two categories: medical cost outlays and administration / overhead costs. In 1993, 95% of premiums went for medical costs at Investor-owned insurers as shown below.  Over the next 14 years, this decreased to just above 80%, a shift of about 14% or one percent per year.  Meanwhile Medicare administration and overhead costs have remained fairly constant through the period.  While some may argue this is not a direct comparison, the fact that Medicare medical loss ratio stayed constant while investor-owned insurers drop significantly cannot be denied.

 Sources: PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Health Research Institute, and U.S. Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services

14% becomes urgent when you consider premium dollars as shown in the chart below. Private insurance runs over $600 billion. 14% of this is nearly $90 billion per year.  Fortunately, one-third of private insurers are non-profit.  But that leaves some $60 billion added overhead including contribution to profits since 1993.

Source: Center for Disease Control – Health, United States 2008 Figure 19

Profits did not grow to $60 billion, but they sure did grow as shown below, exceeding by a huge margin the S&P 500 and CPI for urban wage earners.  All the growth occurred since 2002.

Sources: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Standard and Poors, and Health Insurers’ 10K’s

Not only did investors do well, but so did executives and all at the expense of people paying for health insurance. 7 insurance CEO’s drew nearly $70 million total compensation in 2008.

Still, Investor-owned insurers argue that their profits are a mere 3% of revenue.  Another and better measure is Return on Equity (ROE) which is profitability based on investment.  By this measure, health insurers are earning 17%.  From the chart below some industries do have greater returns, but 17% should be nothing to complain about.  The 10 insurers are even higher than credit card issuers.

Sources: 10K reports for top 10 Investor-owned Insurers and  CCH Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial Ratios, 2009 Edition

Now high returns to executives and investors might have some justification if private insurers were successful in containing and bringing down the major component of health care – medical costs.  Yet, year after year, medical costs outpace the CPI.  One could almost argue that insurers “administer” health care costs rather than provide a value added “management” of those costs.

Competition often has something to do with companies holding down costs.  In competitive markets, insurers need to maximize cost control efforts to maintain market share.  But is there really competition?  The graph below shows the market share of the top two insurers in each state weighted for population covered.

 Sources: AMA, Consumer Union, Sector & Sovereign analysis

Over half the U.S. population lives in states where two insurers control over 60% of the market.  That is not a good omen for competition.  For instance, insurers claim that their market share allows them to negotiate lower rates with providers.  It would not be fair to paint all insurers with the same brush. But a number of insurers have been found not to be driving down rates, but of negotiating with providers to NOT contract lower rates with their competition.  Instead of reducing costs, these illegal acts increase medical costs compared to a truly competitive environment.

Insurers and others also argue that tort reform would bring down medical costs owing to current waste of defensive medicine. There is no argument about the waste. But is it due to defensive practice or simply practice? Data suggests that the latter is more prevalent.

The graph below, derived from Dartmouth College data, groups two sets of hospitals, the 100 highest cost, and 100 lowest cost hospitals for Medicare spending per decedent during the last two years of life.  The bars represent average costs by states that have enacted tort reform setting caps on non medical damages.  For the lowest cost hospitals, tort reform shows virtually no effect on hospital costs. For the highest cost hospitals, it is mixed. But there is no clear evidence that tort reform will substantially lower costs.

Source: Dartmouth_hosp_DAP_Hosp_HRR_ST_01_05.xls

So far, private insurers’ track record suggests that left to the free market, they will not be very successful in lowering costs, either administrative or medical costs, with or without tort reform.  It may be unrealistic to even expect investor-owned insurers to succeed given that their number one priority is to their investors.

Instead of using their actuaries to data mine patterns to help providers reduce costs, their efforts are focused on denying claims and raising premiums to high claims groups.  Instead of returning surpluses to people paying premiums, they are buying back billions of dollars of their own stock to increase value to their shareholders.

Thus far the focus has been the cost of illness. Another aspect is the benefit of staying healthy. Corporations have had success in wellness programs. They not only reduce health care costs, but lower absenteeism. (http://www.uscorporatewellness.com/USCW White Paper 2009.pdf)  Some insurers offer wellness programs, but they often include a health risk assessment on employees and that runs a risk that insurers may use that data in setting rates for the company: if towards lower rates, good. If higher rates, not so good.

Fortunately, large corporations are the biggest block of insured people, and their wellness efforts can have a broad effect.  The graph below shows the U.S. population by source of health care coverage. Big business covers 45% of the population, 28% who self insure and another 17% who shift risk to insurers.

Source: CBO, EBRI, CMS, Goldman Sachs Research estimates

Groups at a disadvantage to big business include individual and small group business and the uninsured that together make up over a quarter (27%) of the population. If private insurers are unable or unwilling to lower administrative and medical costs for them, then the next best alternative is to offer a Public Option.

Without progress in both lowering administrative and medical costs, the affordability credit paid for by the government is going to cost taxpayers more than can be justified.  The question is not whether a non-profit Public Option will succeed. The question is whether private insurers can succeed after years of failing to take the needed steps to contain costs.

The stakes are huge. CBO projects that with a Public Option, the insurance picture changes dramatically as the graph below shows. Medicaid grows a bit for the poorest, but the uninsured and non employer based population can look forward to more affordable insurance.  Meanwhile the majority of the population is unaffected.

 Source: CBO, Oct 7, 2009 letter to Senator Baucus

Download PDF Report >>> CBO Estimate of Healthcare Reform

Medical Loss Ratio

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Medical Loss Ratio or MLR is a ratio used to measure what percent of Premium revenue for health insurance is paid out in medical claims.  The remainder of premium is used to cover selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses as well as operating margin or profit.

In the early 1990’s, the average MLR was over 90% and in 1992-1993 the MLR approached 95%.  Though that may have been a high water mark for MLR, it was not unusual for MLRs in the 1980’s and earlier to be above 90%.  Health insurance companies ran the business with leaner overhead than is seen in more current times.

Wall Street frequently uses the Medical Loss Ratio measure to determine profitability for health Insurers.  For Wall Street, a lower MLR is considered good as it indicates that the insurer has control over its medical claims.  Higher MLR’s may
suggest that the insurer either has a bad book of business or is not so well managed, either or both which could adversely affect profitability.

MLR’s dropped fairly rapidly in the 1990’s and continued a more gradual decline to the low 80% levels in recent years.

Health care reformers have focused on increasing MLR’s as a way to control health care costs. Since MLR by definition is a ratio of two numbers, one can increase the MLR by either reducing premium revenue, or by paying more claims from the same revenue.  Since no one arbitrarily pays claims, forcing an increase in the MLR should put downward pressure on premiums. In that case, what expenses need to be cut.

For them to focus on reducing claims does them little good as lowering claims does nothing to increase the MLR.  For insurers to retain some measure of profitability, they have to look at cutting their general and administrative expenses.

Medical Loss Ratio declining over time

The graph below shows MLR trends from 1992 to 2007.  In the early 1990’s, the average MLR was over 90% and in 1992-1993 the MLR approached 95%.  Though that may have been a high water mark for MLR, it was not unusual for MLRs before 1990 to be above 90%.  Then again, as one goes back in time, more health insurers were non-profit than there are now.  These companies ran the business with leaner overhead than is seen in more current times.

A critical question for health care reform is how fast and how far can these trends be reversed so that more of the premium dollar goes to medical claims instead of overhead expenses and profits.

 Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers Medical Loss Ratio Annual

 MLR includes multiple variables to control

The graph below shows three cases, each with three bars.  The base case is typical of today, the second assumes lower claims, and the third assumes higher claims. 

 The first bar in each case represents claims, SG&A expense  and profit margin. The second bar represents premiums and a small investment income (green). By definition, profit plus expenses must equal revenue so those two bars are always equal length.  The third bar of each case is the MLR. 

In the second case, claims are lower. But unless premiums are reduced, the MLR will go down. Further the premium reduction will eat into profits to maintain the MLR. If claims rise as in the third case, and if the market will bear, higher premiums will generate added profits without incurring a reduction in MLR.

Effect on MLR if profits & expenses held constant

The graph below shows the same three case format as the prior graph. The base case is the same as above.  In the second case, however, both claims and premiums are reduced by 5%.  It also assumes no change in profit or expense.  In an environment of falling costs and claims, the MLR will decline by nearly one %.

But the health care prices have been in an ever increasing trend.  If overhead and profits are held constant, a 5% increase in both claims and premiums will raise the MLR by almost 1%.  But as was shown above, the MLR continues to decline. Unless there is competitive downward pressure on premiums, the profits will tend to rise and MLR’s decline.

A key unanswered question is whether there exists enough competition to drive prices down or at least keep them from rising faster than general inflation. 

Raise the minimum MLR as a step to Cost Control

California is one state that is considering raising the MLR to a minimum of 85%, and increase from about 82%.  The graph below shows two ways this can occur. 

The first is to hold premiums constant as claims rise to 85%.  This will result in significantly lower profits unless overhead is sharply reduced, from around 16% to 13%.

The second method is to reduce premiums to more quickly reach 85% MLR with no changes in claims. If insurers want to maintain current levels of profits, this method will require even steeper cuts in overhead expenses than in the prior case.  Insurers can be expected to resist these moves.

Still, one does not have to go back that many years to find total overhead and profit to be less than 10%.

 

Sensitivity in MLR to changes in overhead and profit

The graph below shows 5 bars representing decreasing levels of overhead and profit and their effect on MLR.  Or conversely, how much do overhead and profit need to be reduced to reach higher MLR levels.

For insurers to reach an 85% MLR without increasing premiums, they will need to reduce overhead and profits by some 20%. An 88% minimum MLR would require reductions of 33%.  Health care reform should allow for significant cuts in general and administrative expenses. With insurance exchanges, selling expenses may be reduced. But it is hard to imagine the levels of cuts needed to help bring about cost control without some reduction in profits as well.

If this nation is serious about reform, it is optimistic to think that insurers’ profits will remain relatively unaffected by these changes. But the high tech industry had a nice ride to new highs, before it was brought back to reasonable levels.

Download PDF Report >>> Medical Loss Ratio

Selected Industries Financial Ratios

Download PDF Report >>> Selected Financial Ratios

A publication in its 40th year titled Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial Ratios tracks 50 operating and financial factors in nearly 200 industries. 4 measures for 8 industries are highlighted in the graphs below. They reflect tax return data (IRS Form 1120) through June of 2006.  In addition, selected 2007 financial data from the nation’s Top 10 for-profit health insurers came from their SEC 10K reports.  The Almanac industries include tax returns for the following:

Industry Tax Returns Revenues
Hospitals , Nursing Care 10,498 $76.0B
Outpatient  Care Centers 4,453 $24.8B
Engineering 60,986 $133B
Computer Systems  Design 62,135 $117.8B
Management Consulting 134,243 $138.7B
Commercial Banking 30,534 $55.4B
Credit Card Issuers 46,735 $28.7B
Investment Banking 5,402 $29.4B

The Top 10 health insurers had revenues of $242.5B. When comparing net income as a % of sales, these insurers ranked lower than other industries as shown in the first two graphs below.  The top 10 are in red below.

The Top 10 pay a higher % in taxes so their before tax ratio is slightly better (upper left graph) than after tax ratio (upper right graph.)  But is % of sales a proper comparison across industries?  Higher revenue industries all tend to have lower Income as a % of sales than do lower revenue industries.

Rather than dividing net income by sales, one can divide net income by equity.  Equity is how much shareholders’ money is invested in the business.  It takes into account loans.  And it puts firms of different size on a more equal footing.

Return on equity or ROE is a recognized way for comparing companies in different industries.  The two lowest graphs show average ROE for the Top 10 compared to 8 industries. Though not the highest before/after tax, Top 10 returns exceed hospitals, outpatient care centers, computer systems design, credit card issuers and investment bankers.  Returns trail highly profitable, engineering, management consulting, commercial banking, and physicians and lawyers (not shown).

In summary, health insurers are fairly profitable enterprises as currently structured.  But some ask whether at least part of that profitability is derived from questionable denials of claims made by their subscribers.

Download PDF Report >>> Selected Financial Ratios